DAVID GIBBS’S REVOLT OF THE RICH

David Gibbs’ book, Revolt of the Rich, is interesting and valuable on so many levels. Even the title rings an unexpected note: ‘revolt’ is usually associated with the powerless, not the powerful.  Another general assumption is that the turn toward conservative politics, both at home and abroad, was associated with President Reagen, not the kindly peanut farmer Carter. But as the author demonstrates, radical change had been painstakingly planned and carefully developed by the disgruntled rich against the ‘compromise’ they had had to accept going back to the presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

David Gibbs presents his argument on two levels. For those interested in a ‘deep dive,’ about one half of his volume consists of Notes devoted to exhaustive documentation based on archival research. The other half, clearly based on this research, offers an eminently convincing analysis of events very much worth revisiting for their own sake, but also because they anticipate and explain our current state of affairs.

President Kennedy’s contest with US Steel’s high pricing of this essential commodity and President Johnson’s promise of the Great Society represented the continued policy of ‘compromise’ the rich objected to. Their pushback eventually resulted in the victory of the Republican Richard Nixon to the presidency. But before the Watergate scandal cut his efforts short, Nixon furthered their common goals by galvanizing corporate interests to fund right-wing think tanks. The American Enterprise Institute, in particular, became a model for transforming the corporate agenda into powerful government lobbies. They achieved these results by promoting neo-conservative intellectuals like Irving Kristol, and libertarian ideologues like Ayn Rand and Milton Friedman. And in order to rally the popular masses to their camp, they also supported religious leaders like Jerry Falwell and Billy Graham.      

Of course, the anti-Vietnam War movement, especially organized on College Campuses in the 60s, as well as the Civils Rights movement of the 50s and the Feminist movement of the 70s were important manifestations of opposition. But as David Gibbs documents, there occurred a split between social and economic issues on the Left. Labor leaders had joined anti-communist positions during the Mc Carthy years, which led to a dissociation from international working-class solidarity. Grateful for the good jobs offered by the war industry, they even took a pro-Vietnam War position.

While “fusion” between elites and the rest of the population was actively promoted by the New Right, cultural issues of race, gender, religion, sexuality and life styles remained “wedge issues” actively exploited by moneyed interests. Written off as “sex, drugs and rock n’ roll” in the headlines, and co-opted by Hollywood, whose films presented the ‘lower classes’ as uncouth, the ‘liberal’ Left became dissociated from working class politics. Thus, the Humphrey-Hawkins Bill initiated by the Congressional Black Caucus, which sought to combine civil rights with a broad economic program was not successful, and austerity measures to address the problem of inflation were not challenged.

On the foreign policy front the “Vietnam Syndrome” reflected the need to address the military and prestige failures of that war. But although détente with the Soviet Union and “ping-pong diplomacy” with China were initiated, the Nixon Doctrine did not give up on building military alliances and covert operations in support of American interests abroad.

But because these moves weakened military expenditures, the Democrats, under the leadership of Scoop Jackson, the “Boeing Senator” from Seattle, joined the Republicans in calling for a renewed Cold War. Thus, Jackson’s labor supporters found themselves on the same side as financial investors whose arms sales to Europe and Latin America had been losing ground. And now a new political player in American politics, the Israel Lobby, also militated for arms buildup. The American Jewish community, traditionally supportive of progressive politics, became increasingly identified with the State of Israel, which had to maintain itself within a hostile Arab environment. The wars of 1967 and 1973 highlighted the dependence of Israel on US financial and military support.

The practical and moral justification for abandoning détente was further articulated by a number of prominent intellectuals, who abandoned their liberal (and even radical) positions and became known as “neo-cons.” But basing their argument on the violation of ‘human rights’ proved, as David Gibbs points out, problematical. After all, the repeated support of dictatorial regimes – say in Iran or Latin America – had been an active policy of the United States. Blaming it all on ‘the other side,’ however, proved workable: the early anti-interventionist stance morphed into a pro-interventionist stance.

Thus, when Jimmy Carter reconquered the presidency for the Democrats in 1976, the Committee on the Present Danger, formed the same year, was ready for ideological contest. While President Carter attempted a policy of international accommodation, the American public was swayed by the argument that standing up to Soviet policies was a matter of national security. Never mind that the majority of the population had to carry the burden of the high cost of the arms race for those who profited from it. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, however, offered the ideal excuse to those who feared the spread of Communism and those who welcomed it for the sake of revamping the money-making military machine. The Carter Doctrine went along with economic sanctions, and a significant increase of the military budget.   

This was bound to aggravate the economic problems Carter would have to face, particularly given the alliance with the business elites his predecessors Nixon and Ford had securely established. By then the massive indoctrination of the general public had done its job, including Carter himself. As a Southern Democrat, peanut farmer, Sunday School teacher and Airforce cadet his bent was naturally conservative. He too would be prepared to rely on the advice of ‘experts’ in the field of national and international affairs.

As David Gibbs admits, the technicalities of economic theory and practice are challenging. He even apologizes for inducting the reader into some of its details. But understanding the undermining of government controls in favor of the prevailing doctrine of ‘free markets’ is important because it affects our lives. Such a policy incentivizes reliance on short-term profits through financial manipulation for the moneyed few instead of long-term investment in manufacturing for the working many. Inevitably, de-industrialization leads to unemployment.

During his time as governor of Georgia, labor unions were not a major focus of Carter’s administration. The Coca Cola Company, however, one of the principal businesses based in Atlanta, became an important ally, and prepared him to associate with more influential business leaders, like David Rockefeller, who was president of Chase Manhattan Bank, chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, and founder of the Trilateral Commission. These contacts proved mutually beneficial – both for Carter’s political career, and for the business community to advance their goals under cover of presumably liberal Democratic leadership.

While Carter did attempt fiscal stimulus to create jobs, this proved insufficient. Taxing the rich to replenish the government coffers as FDR had done was no longer an option. Austerity measures, however, became the option for Carter as it had been for his Republican predecessors. In order to restore confidence in the value of the dollar at the international as well as the domestic levels, controlling inflation was a priority for Wall Street and the Banks. Carter went along by implementing anti-inflation policies, and this led to a serious recession. His appointment of Paul Volcker to head the Federal Reserve, who undertook more anti-inflation measures by raising interest rates, resulted in the bankruptcy of small farmers and businessmen, furthering more recession.

However, the bid of Edward Kennedy for the presidency during the next election cycle to advance “real” democratic policies failed. Evidently, the Democrats could only survive by promoting anti-tax policies like California governor Jerry Brown’s Proposition 13. The paradox of Carter’s administration, whose mild reform attempts were replaced by a definite move to right-wing “laissez-faire” fixes, is that he was personally blamed for their negative results. The policies themselves, however, massively supported by the corporate and financial interests, became ‘the new normal.’ This victory of the rich was then successfully presided over by the newly ‘acting’ President Ronald Reagan.

David Gibbs’ concluding observations, among them quoting Joseph Stieglitz that we live under a government “of the 1 percent, by the 1 percent, for the 1 percent “ is something this reader can readily recognize. I hope that other readers will appreciate the hard work that went into documenting the complex history which deliberately constructed the social structure we now live under. However, in other parts of the world like China or the Global South, a revolt against the rich seems underway. Perhaps David Gibbs’ hope that the powerless can challenge the powerful once again may need to look to international solidarity for inspiration.

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